Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2019 熊治 一带一路倡议下中国对外援助有效性的研究 - § 1 reference coded [ 0.28% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.28% Coverage

基于中国对“一带一路”发展中国家的援助数据，采用动态面板系统 GMM 方法进行研究，结   
果发现: 中国对外援助对其经济增长具有显著的促进作用，但是存在“门槛效应”。

Files\\Jounral Articles in Chinese\\2020 于浩淼 双轨制-中国农业多边对外援助治理结构探索 - § 2 references coded [ 0.78% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.58% Coverage

中国主要关注国内农业发展与粮食安全问题，偏 重于“引进来”。在全球治理体系中，中国作为后来者在国际组织中的作用 还有待提升，参与全球粮食治理的内在动力尚有待提高，在通过国际组织平 台开展对外援助中尚缺乏总体战略框架的引领，在国际规则制定等方面也缺 乏一定的主导权，对国际组织的捐资及提高使用效果总体上还缺乏经验，一 定程度上导致参与有关政策、协定、规则、标准等制定的步伐滞后，难以掌 握战略制高点，也很难从技术上保障自身权益

Reference 2 - 0.20% Coverage

提高中国参与全球治理的能力，既要了解国际发展话语体系，也要充分   
认识议程设置的重要性，重点提高规则制定、议题设置、宣传倡导、统筹协 调等方面的能力。

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2006 China’s Engagement in Africa scope significance and consequences - § 8 references coded [ 1.67% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.35% Coverage

By oﬀering their African counterparts a mix of political and economic incentives, the Chinese government is successfully driving home the message that increased Sino-African cooperation will inevitably result in a ‘win-win situation’ for both sides. The power of this argument is enhanced by a subtle discourse which posits China not only as an appealing alternative partner to the West, but also as a better choice for Africa

Reference 2 - 0.27% Coverage

Strictly speaking, though, many of these projects are not commercial. Some are ﬁnanced through ‘tied’ Chinese aid. Others are not proﬁtable because the Chinese tend to set costs below market rates. And yet the lack of short-term commercial proﬁts does not preclude that investments will yield signiﬁcant returns in the long term

Reference 3 - 0.19% Coverage

China’s economic engagement will encourage sustainable economic growth in Africa. The evidence from an examination of textile industries, one of the few African economic success stories in recent years, is ambivalent indeed.

Reference 4 - 0.12% Coverage

Its defence of sovereignty, often to the beneﬁt of unsavoury regimes, is likely to undermine existing eﬀorts at political liberalisation at large.

Reference 5 - 0.22% Coverage

Revenues from trade (and taxes), development assistance and other means of support widen the margins of manoeuvre of Africa’s autocrats, and help them to rein in domestic demands for democracy and the respect for human rights (for Zimbabwe, see CSM 30.5.2005).

Reference 6 - 0.19% Coverage

On the other, however, one has to question the coherence and credibility of Chinese peacekeeping eﬀorts if the country otherwise pursues strategies which may contribute to the eruption or prolongation of violent conﬂicts.

Reference 7 - 0.08% Coverage

In economic terms, China’s impact on Africa’s place in the global economy is equally uncertain.

Reference 8 - 0.25% Coverage

This raises important questions as to the relationship between China and Africa’s reform-minded bodies, precisely because the AU, ECOWAS and NEPAD have recently espoused procedures and principles that clearly contravene the cornerstones of Chinese statecraft (i.e. sovereignty, non-interference).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2007 China and Africa- Building a Strategic Partnership - § 7 references coded [ 1.36% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.26% Coverage

ortant partnerships. What is particularly attractive for many African rulers is the alternative development paradigm propagated by China: non-interference in state sovereignty, freedom from western hegemony, and an absence of any conditions in giving aid (with the exception of the ‘one-China’ principle). There are certain tensions, however, one of which is trad

Reference 2 - 0.23% Coverage

Another potential source of friction is political. A discourse on human rights and democracy is gradually taking root in Africa, albeit unevenly, promoted by newly created African organizations like the Africa Union (AU) and the NEPAD. This poses a serious challenge to the previously cherished principle of non-interference.

Reference 3 - 0.18% Coverage

China strongly supported African struggles for independence. In the   
ﬁ rst phase of independence, it tended to concentrate on African states that appeared to be following a self-reliant, socialist course, for example, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Zambia and Tanzania

Reference 4 - 0.10% Coverage

In other, so-called reactionary African states, however, it was inclined to support radical or revolutionary dissidents and oppositional groups

Reference 5 - 0.30% Coverage

Chinese aid was particularly attractive to African rulers because it was supplied on terms that apparently posed no obstacles to state sovereignty and economic independence. According to Hyden and Mukandala (1999: 157), the major thrust of China’s aid was to ship tonnes of Chinese-made equipment, Chinese goods, and large groups of experts to the recipient countries to build ‘complete plant projects’ or turnkey projects.

Reference 6 - 0.19% Coverage

Chinese arms sales to Africa have actually increased since the 2000 Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, in which China promised to cooperate in attempts to stop the illegal production and trafﬁ cking in small arms and light weapons in Africa

Reference 7 - 0.09% Coverage

And ﬁ nally, there are growing internal and external pressures on African leaders to introduce good governance and democracy.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2008 China and global development towards a Global Asian Er - § 4 references coded [ 0.66% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

Set alongside such positive developments, there is beginning to be concern about the types of   
labour processes and working conditions that are likely to result from Chinese FDI or, indeed, Chinese outsourcing in the developing world.

Reference 2 - 0.21% Coverage

t is in some African countries that these problems are likely to be experienced initially, as Chinese ﬁrms are now the leading foreign players in the development of transport infrastructure there and are increasingly prominent in telecommunications, mining, logging and, of course, energy extraction.

Reference 3 - 0.13% Coverage

Alden (2007, p. 14), for instance, reports that more than 800 Chinese companies are now operating in 49 African countries, with 480 of these involved in joint ventures withAfrican ﬁrms.

Reference 4 - 0.16% Coverage

Notwithstanding the fact that many of these companies generally prefer to bring (indentured) Chinese workers with them – thus leaving local Africans unemployed – it is likely that working for such companies leaves much to be desired.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2008 Dong and Chapman The Chinese Government Scholarship Program An Eff - § 4 references coded [ 1.61% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.33% Coverage

Findings indicate that participants are generally satisﬁed with their experiences in China and are positive about the impact of the program in building friendships with their home countries. The authors discuss the implications of these ﬁndings in terms of ChinaÕs emerging prominence as a provider of international development assistance.

Reference 2 - 0.70% Coverage

While statistics are incomplete, more than 30 of the international students   
who have studied in China since 1950 have taken oﬃcial positions at the ministerial level in their home countries, more than 20 of them have served as ambassadors to China on behalf of their countries, more than 30 of them have served as counselors to China; and over 200 have become professors and associate professors at universities in their countries. In addition, many of the middle-aged and young diplomats in the embassies of foreign countries stationed in China have studied in China, and a great number of students who have studied in China are now engaged in diﬀerent exchange and cooperation activities with China across many ﬁelds (Zhang et al. 2003).

Reference 3 - 0.18% Coverage

Perhaps most importantly, respondents (91.6%) believed that the scholarship program would contribute to the development of a long-term friendship between China and their home countries.

Reference 4 - 0.41% Coverage

For educational aid donors in general, this current study might suggest   
alternative ways of providing aid. The vast majority of the scholarship recipients regarded the scholarship program as supportive of development of long-term friendships between China and the scholarship recipientsÕ home countries. This indicates that the scholarship programs have contributed to fostering goodwill toward the Chinese government.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2008 Giles Mohan New African Choices The Politics of Chinese Engagement - § 16 references coded [ 2.49% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.13% Coverage

The increasing numbers of Chinese on the continent is producing social change and begs a whole set of further questions around the relations between the ‘hosts’ and Chinese (Mohan and Kale, 2007).

Reference 2 - 0.14% Coverage

his manipulated politics there are complex racial and cultural discourses of whether the Chinese are treated as different and ‘other’ by Africans or are somehow the same insofar as they are ‘not white’

Reference 3 - 0.06% Coverage

Again, we need to avoid generalisations about the impact of China on Africa’s politics.

Reference 4 - 0.21% Coverage

First, states undergoing transitions to democracy. As we know China does not get actively involved in governance reforms so in such states China’s role will be minimal given that any criticism of authoritarianism and moves towards liberal democracy will simultaneously reflect badly on China’s domestic record.

Reference 5 - 0.19% Coverage

aid have been at high levels which include Angola, Sudan and Nigeria. Here, China’s role is likely to   
New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement 35   
exacerbate a resource curse and benefits will accrue to elites thereby undermining development and democracy.

References 6-7 - 0.17% Coverage

The Sudan has proved the most controversial of these with China supplying arms to the government and its militias in order to suppress opposition in Darfur as well as allowing the Sudanese government to mount attacks from Chinese run oil facilities

Reference 8 - 0.21% Coverage

are states emerging from conflict. China’s peacekeeping interventions are generally welcomed, but only if other economic activities do not enhance inequality. For example, in Liberia the Chinese contributed to peacekeeping efforts, but Chinese logging companies were also aggressively stripping forest

Reference 9 - 0.15% Coverage

What is interesting politically is the bilateral nature of China’s aid and the ways in which it conflicts with other donors’ moves towards coordination as well as with pan-African attempts to direct Africa’s development

Reference 10 - 0.19% Coverage

The US and Western European donors have for some time been pushing a ‘rights-based’ development agenda (Mohan and Holland, 2001), which is a liberal package of aid designed to engender freedoms though various legal reforms, democratisation and good governance initiatives.

Reference 11 - 0.11% Coverage

China emphasises only the social and economic group based rights and see these as underpinning not only China’s own development model, but also its aid programm

Reference 12 - 0.24% Coverage

Some western commentators, and especially American ones, use these different takes on rights to emphasise the inherently dangerous and self-serving nature of China’s foreign policy as well as criticising China’s domestic democratic credentials. All of this is designed to enhance the legitimacy of western approaches to democracy and development aid.

Reference 13 - 0.20% Coverage

However, the Darfur crisis may prove to be a turning point at which China realises its need to be more careful about the governance side of its aid and investment. International condemnation was so fierce that there are signs that China will not repeat such approaches elsewhere (Alden, 2007)

Reference 14 - 0.23% Coverage

While the Chinese state-backed investors are relatively lax about transparency, accountability and sustainability of investments, NEPAD has been developing the African Peer Review Mechanism. This is an effort to encourage African countries to set standards and put in place procedures for vetting and monitoring investments.

Reference 15 - 0.15% Coverage

We suggested that China’s involvement will not fundamentally alter Africa’s place in the global division of labour. It simply adds a new and significant market without challenging the continent’s extraversion.

Reference 16 - 0.12% Coverage

History suggests that in some states this will entrench rentier states, concentrate ownership in a few hands, and deliver limited multipliers to marginalised Africans

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2009 Chinas diplomacy toward Africa drivers and constraints1[retrieved\_2020-09-21] - § 4 references coded [ 0.45% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

n Sudan, in particular, China’s credibility as a responsible nation is questioned.

Reference 2 - 0.12% Coverage

Moreover, Chinese aid is an alternative to the aid from Western countries and international organizations which Africans look upon as representing Western interests (Marks, 2006).

Reference 3 - 0.13% Coverage

China’s growing engagement in Africa constitutes competition – competition for resources, competition for markets, and competition for political and military inﬂuence on the continent

Reference 4 - 0.15% Coverage

Western governments have expressed concern that by providing economic, political, and military support, Beijing is propping up regimes known for their abysmal human rights records. China–Sudan ties are a case in poin

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2010 BuildingcComplementarities in Africa between Different - § 6 references coded [ 1.14% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.31% Coverage

Aid effectiveness and efficiency also increased in the last two decades by the shift from technical assistance and project   
finance to general budget support and to a lesser extent, sectoral budget support. This aid instrument is used to channel funds directly through the budget of the recipient country thereby avoiding aid proliferation and fragmentation,

Reference 2 - 0.20% Coverage

General budget support also reduces transaction costs of aid projects (Acharya et al., 2006) and deals with recurrent costs which are an essential element in sustainability in the long term (Agbonyitor, 1998; World Bank, 2005).

Reference 3 - 0.22% Coverage

As budget support operations are channelled through the general budget, this aid delivery instrument requires adequate budget   
control, internal audit and procurement standards and therefore is mainly used in countries with higher governance standards.

Reference 4 - 0.06% Coverage

Another challenge is that China does not apply OECD-DAC definitions of ODA

Reference 5 - 0.17% Coverage

On the one hand   
ODA is well defined for DAC countries and refers to concessionary loans, debt relief, grants and humanitarian aid, while on the other hand China does not necessary follow this aid definition

Reference 6 - 0.18% Coverage

Although Chinese goods and services are highly competitive compared to OECD-DAC members’ countries, the tying of aid could create distortions and undermine national ownership of the recipient countries

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2010 Kiala ChinaAngola aid relations- strategic cooperation for development~ - § 1 reference coded [ 0.19% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage

However, China does not entirely conform to the OECD on matters related to aid; it is also not a member of the DAC. Hence, the data on China’s aid, as well as its focus, purpose, terms and conditions are controversial because they are not clear.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2010 Samy China’s Aid Policies in Africa Opportunities and - § 11 references coded [ 3.01% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.26% Coverage

For the African countries, aid, and more importantly trade and investment, are all welcome as they can provide the necessary wherewithal to reduce their own dependence on revenue from natural resources, and free themselves from the hegemony of traditional Western donors.

Reference 2 - 0.31% Coverage

Chinese aid is also seen as a means to overcome aid volatility and   
unpredictability. Aid ﬂows from traditional donors have tended to be very volatile and provided with too many conditions over the years, despite recent eﬀorts such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Eﬀectiveness (OECD, 2005) to improve the system of aid delivery.

Reference 3 - 0.21% Coverage

Furthermore, aid tends to be mildly pro-cyclical (meaning that countries are receiving it when economic activity is picking up) and it is very diﬃcult to predict how much aid will be received based on the commitments of donors.

Reference 4 - 0.16% Coverage

More generally, the failure of adjustment lending and neo-liberal policies in Africa has led to a distrust of policies and conditions imposed by traditional donors

Reference 5 - 0.21% Coverage

There is thus a fear that China’s co-operation with non-transparent regimes in order to gain access to oil and natural resources will not respect the rights of indigenous peoples, the environment and labour standards

Reference 6 - 0.32% Coverage

Askouri (2007), in a detailed examination of China’s policies in Sudan, argues that Chinese assistance has encouraged dictatorships and tyranny in several African countries, including Sudan, Chad and Zimbabwe, and that China does in fact interfere in the domestic aﬀairs of its partners in order to support current ruling regimes.

Reference 7 - 0.18% Coverage

This practice of tying aid to inputs in the donor country has for long been a feature of aid from the traditional donors and has been shown to reduce aid eﬀectiveness because of a lack of competition.

Reference 8 - 0.21% Coverage

One concern that has been raised both by civil society and by the international community is that these cheap loans may encourage recipient countries to borrow irresponsibly and accumulate debt beyond their ability to repay.

Reference 9 - 0.26% Coverage

here is a risk that these countries will start borrowing and become heavily indebted countries again in the near future, at a time when the international ﬁnancial institutions have been placing more emphasis on debt-monitoring through the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF).1

Reference 10 - 0.23% Coverage

. Unfortunately, Chinese aid to countries such as the Sudan and Zimbabwe tends to make headlines, but it is less well known that China also provides aid to countries such as Mauritius and Botswana, which are well-governed, democratic countries.

Reference 11 - 0.66% Coverage

As far as the question of debt sustainability is concerned, there is no clear evidence that the debt levels of African countries have increased beyond their ability to repay as a result of loans from China. Reisen and Ndoye (2008) did not ﬁnd any evidence of imprudent lending for countries that beneﬁted from debt relief until 2006. In fact, the authors point out that the debt relief provided by China itself, together with increased exports and growth of African countries, have helped keep debt ratios below the levels of distress set by the DSF. So, it does not seem that the fears of another debt crisis are warranted yet, but the lack of transparency of China’s lending is an issue that needs to be addressed

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2011 Bräutigam Aid ‘With Chinese Characteristics’ Chinese Foreig - § 10 references coded [ 3.23% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

A large reason for this lies in a lack of transparency by the Chinese government regarding their ﬂows of ofﬁcial aid and other ofﬁcial ﬁnance.

Reference 2 - 0.30% Coverage

Yet the OECD has an entire set of norms for how ofﬁcial state support can be linked to commercial arrangements by private actors—via ofﬁcial export credits, for example. The Chinese argue, in fact, that their own system of export credits by and large follow those norm

Reference 3 - 0.66% Coverage

In 2007, Moíses Naím, the former editor of Foreign Policy, published an op‐ed on ‘rogue aid’ in the New York Times relating a story he was allegedly told by a friend at the World Bank (Naím, 2007). ‘After months of negotiation,’ he said that the World Bank and the Nigerian government ‘agreed on a $5 million project that would allow private companies to come in and help clean up’ Nigeria’s corrupt and mismanaged railways. Just as they were about to sign, ‘the Chinese government offered Nigeria $9 billion to rebuild the entire rail network — no bids, no conditions and no need to reform.’

Reference 4 - 0.40% Coverage

Labelling China’s   
offer ‘rogue aid’, Naím stated that the effect of this ‘development assistance’ was ‘typically to stiﬂe real progress while hurting ordinary citizens.’ There was just one problem with this story: it never happened. What did happen illustrates again the difﬁculty in trying to push Chinese engagement into more familiar categories.

Reference 5 - 0.23% Coverage

Although Chinese aid principles clearly emphasise ‘equipment of Chinese manufacture’, there appears to be some ﬂexibility in the degree to which aid is tied, at least via the concessional loan instrumen

Reference 6 - 0.39% Coverage

The Chinese emphasis on local ownership can lead to ‘prestige’ projects that do not appear to be poverty‐reducing: a new government ofﬁce building, a sports stadium or a conference centre. They rarely give budget support, and they have not contributed to common pool ‘basket ﬁnancing’ of sectors, which is a growing trend among the DAC donors.

Reference 7 - 0.25% Coverage

One of the toughest problems in any effort by the DAC to initiate efforts to boost cooperation and coordination with China and other middle income donors is that China is not (and probably cannot be) a member of the OECD.

Reference 8 - 0.33% Coverage

This aspect has largely been ignored in discussions of China as a ‘donor’. If Chinese ﬁnance from the China Eximbank is largely comprised of export credits, the OECD’s Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees is the most appropriate group to coordinate with the Chinese banks.

Reference 9 - 0.31% Coverage

Beijing’s stubborn refusal to be transparent about ofﬁcial aid, export credits and other ﬂows of development ﬁnance has created headaches for the Chinese that could have been avoided, in some cases, simply by publishing information already being collected in China.

Reference 10 - 0.20% Coverage

The marked increase in information ﬂows from Chinese embassies and announcements by Chinese leaders indicates that data on external assistance is no longer a state secret.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2012 China as a net donor tracking dollars and sense - § 3 references coded [ 0.53% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage

The general perception is that China provides a needed alternative to the Northern donors, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Reference 2 - 0.11% Coverage

Ofﬁcials in the donor organizations have voiced a range of opinion—from   
‘cautious optimism, to wariness, and outright hostility in a few cases’—about China as an aid provider (Karp 2009)

Reference 3 - 0.34% Coverage

although China’s political elite want to continue to ‘lay low’   
internationally, ‘focus on building national capacity’ and maintain their ‘Third World’ self-identiﬁcation, the reality is that simply keeping to the status quo is no longer viable. China’s aid recipients and development partners are starting to   
600 Gregory T Chin   
press China’s political elites to rethink the related structure of their economic relations and, more importantly, are pressing Beijing to rework the arrangements in order to strengthen the longer-term viability (‘sustainability’) of the economic ﬂows.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2012 Indra De Soysa Enter The Dragon An Empirical Analysis of Chinese versus US - § 6 references coded [ 1.68% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage

Our ﬁndings indicate that Chinese arms transfers, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, are made in larger amounts to countries that respect the physical integrity rights of people as well as to countries higher on a scale of democracy than transfers made by the United States, which seems to prefer the security of autocracies.

Reference 2 - 0.12% Coverage

Rather its policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states may naturally lead Beijing to sell more weapons to democracies because they may prefer Chinese arms to expensive American arms.

Reference 3 - 0.20% Coverage

On the other hand, China’s economic motives in Africa do not threaten democracies. National interest, not ideology, drives US and Chinese weapons exports to Africa. Indeed, if China seeks to solidify its economic fortunes in Africa, it seems natural that she would seek to deal more with regimes that would respect property rights and uphold contracts.

Reference 4 - 0.97% Coverage

Western views of China in Africa are ‘‘skewed by elite perceptions of China as a rival for resources and inﬂuence in Africa.’’ Palpable concern about losing resources and commercial opportunities to China emerges from a 2006 Council on Foreign Relations report: ‘‘All across Africa today, China is acquiring control of natural resource assets, outbidding Western contractors on major infrastructure projects, providing soft loans and other incentives to bolster its competitive advantage.’’ This report adds that Beijing helps ‘‘even the United States’ closest allies’’ to escape Washington’s inﬂuence (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006:40–41). The vicechair of the U.S. House subcommittee on Africa also expressed anxiety about China’s growing presence in Africa: ‘‘China’s increasing engagement in Africa is a concern, and we need to focus on it before Beijing becomes fully established’’ (Legett 2005). The impact of ‘‘skewed elite perceptions’’ is visible   
not only in media and elite discourses about China in Africa, but also in US mass opinion. A 2007 Zogby poll found half of Americans regarded China’s inﬂuence in Africa as a great or moderate threat to US national interests.37 Consistent with our ﬁndings regarding arms transfers, US elite and popular perceptions on China’s presence in Africa differ from those of Africans themselves. Although Taylor argues ‘‘China will invariably be found standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the autocrat…facing down its own people,’’ (Taylor 2007:1), in fact average Africans evaluate China’s role on their continent more favorably than they do the United States’s. According to a 2007 Pew Foundation survey of citi-

Reference 5 - 0.14% Coverage

However, the dynamic-rising-hegemon hypothesis suggests that Beijing shows restraint in its arms exports to authoritarians not because of Western pressure per se, but because China as the world’s great workshop is not very dependent on arms sales

Reference 6 - 0.07% Coverage

It arguably produces more liberal outcomes than Washington’s linkage of arms transfers to strategic interests.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2012 Reilly A Norm-Taker or a Norm-Maker Chinese aid in South - § 17 references coded [ 4.54% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.56% Coverage

International and Chinese norms on ODA   
A norm is simply a set of expectations about appropriate behavior for a given identity. Norms tend to be more powerful if they are logically consistent across a set of ideals, institutionalized (included in ofﬁcial documents; embedded within formal institutions), and consistent with actual practice. As the self-proclaimed ‘venue and voice’ for the world’s largest bilateral aid donors, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) has actively sought to shape international norms deﬁning effective and appropriate aid. This effort culminated in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, endorsed by 91 countries, followed by the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action.

Reference 2 - 0.68% Coverage

Ownership and alignment   
The shift ‘from donorship to ownership’ is one ofthe most signiﬁcant norms articulated in Paris and reafﬁrmed in Accra.18 Longstanding ideals underpinning China’s aid program align with this norm. As President Hu Jintao told a 2005 UN development meeting: ‘The path to successful development lies in a country’s independent choice of the path and mode of development suited to its national conditions’.19 The reluctance to prescribe speciﬁc policies for aid recipients also coheres with China’s rhetoric of respecting state sovereignty. While China has been reluctant to follow the Accra Agenda’s call for donors to channel half of their assistance through host country ﬁduciary systems, China’s aid programs are derived primarily from recipients’ requests.20 As a result, Beijing often ﬁnds itself constructing prestige projects at the request of a friendly president, such as a new stadium or government building.

Reference 3 - 0.14% Coverage

Results and mutual accountability   
China’s program is clearly results oriented. Chinese leaders insist that achieving economic growth should be the core objective for assistance programs.

Reference 4 - 0.43% Coverage

China has improved the transparency of its aid program in recent years, most notably   
with theApril 2011WhitePaperon aid. However, theWhitePaperonly reports cumulative data (1950–2009) on loans, grants, debt cancellations, and overall aid distribution by sector, region, and recipients’ income levels.24 This limited approach reﬂects awidespread assumption that transparency is simply ‘propaganda’ useful to ‘win more support and understanding for our aid program abroad, promote our diplomatic work, and enable our assistance to have a broader and more positive inﬂuence in the world’.25

Reference 5 - 0.11% Coverage

Harmonization   
To combat ‘excessive fragmentation of donor activities’, the Paris Declaration urges donors to enhance country-level collaboration

Reference 6 - 0.27% Coverage

Ofﬁcials express a willingness to learn from other donors,27   
yet in practice China has been reluctant to join donor-organized   
consortia. In interviews, Chinese aid ofﬁcials explain that they have little in common with other donors, and that in many cases ‘it would be inconvenient’ for Chinese ofﬁcials to be seen by aid recipients as collaborating with Western donors

Reference 7 - 0.22% Coverage

Conditionality and civil society   
To mitigate the contradiction between its support for local ownership and tolerance of donor conditionality imposed on aid recipients, the Paris Declaration urges donors to ‘draw conditions, whenever possible from a partner’s national development strategy’.

Reference 8 - 0.26% Coverage

China, however, rejects the imposition of political or economic conditions (with the exception ofnon-recognition ofTaiwan) as interference in recipients’ domestic affairs. The second ofeight principles offoreign aid declared by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964 and reiterated in the 2011 White Paper, was to ‘respect sovereignty and never attach conditions

Reference 9 - 0.11% Coverage

The distinction is clearest over tied aid—requiring that a certain percentage of aid funds be used to purchase services or items from the donor country.

Reference 10 - 0.14% Coverage

members agreed to untie their aid (except technical cooperation and food aid) to the Least Developed Countries, an agreement extended in 2008 to 39 highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs)

Reference 11 - 0.10% Coverage

In contrast, China explicitly requires that only Chinese companies complete the infrastructure projects funded by its concessional loans.

Reference 12 - 0.27% Coverage

Table 1. China’s acceptance of DAC norms Formal DAC norms   
Ownership Alignment   
Harmonization Results   
Mutual accountability   
Informal/deﬁnitional DAC norms Conditionality   
Support for local civil society Aid only beneﬁts recipient   
Does China accept this norm? Yes   
Yes No   
Yes No\*   
No No No   
Note: \* China accepts the mutual accountability norm, but not the implied transparency norm.

Reference 13 - 0.27% Coverage

If China is indeed being inﬂuenced by international norms, we would expect to see Chinese aid increasingly oriented toward broadly deﬁned social and economic interests of the recipient state. Aid should go to local actors, including civil society, be clearly distinguished from Chinese strategic and commercial interests, and prioritize the process of aid delivery.

Reference 14 - 0.22% Coverage

Alternatively, if China is sustaining its alternative approach to aid, we would expect to see a rhetorical emphasis upon mutual beneﬁts, the pursuit of China’s own strategic and commercial interests, a central role for Chinese ﬁrms and laborers, and reluctance to participate in donor-led consortia.

Reference 15 - 0.16% Coverage

My working hypothesis is: China is more likely to be inﬂuenced by international norms in democratic countries where international aid agencies are deeply involved and where China has minimal strategic and economic interests.

Reference 16 - 0.28% Coverage

as constructivists would expect, China’s accommodation to international aid norms varies with the thickness of the institutional environment. In Cambodia and Laos, which have an extensive international aid presence, China’s aid program shows some signs of nascent socialization. In Myanmar, China’s aid program has made almost no accommodation with international norms or approaches.

Reference 17 - 0.31% Coverage

For China to be a successful norm-maker, other states will have to accept these ideas as valid and appropriate standards, an outcome that remains uncertain. We can also ask the same question—to what degree do we see evidence of either norm-taking or norm-making—in examining Chinese aid in Africa and Latin America, China’s engagement with global aid institutions, and in assessing the views of Chinese experts and policymakers on ODA.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Brant Chinese Aid in the South Pacific Linked to Resour - § 9 references coded [ 1.75% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.43% Coverage

“Many countries appreciate China because they give them what they want” (Interview SP010, 17 September 2009); “The total lack of conditionality of their aid is certainly appealing to any developing country” (Interview SP049, 20 October 2009). Whilst many of these concerns are undoubtedly legitimate, the attempt to paint China as “bad” vis-à-vis traditional donors and the suggestion that recipient governments only like China because of these characteristics entrenches the patronising approach to “developing” countries, which was a factor that led them to seek out China in the ﬁrst place.

Reference 2 - 0.23% Coverage

In the case of concessional loans in particular, the contractor must be a Chinese company and at least 50 per cent of the materials must be procured from China. Because of this feature, Chinese aid is heavily criticised by other donors (and recipient communities) for being “tied”, against the OECD–DAC trend of “untying” aid.

Reference 3 - 0.07% Coverage

In reality, most aid is still tied – to consultants and   
experts – so in this aspect China is no different”

Reference 4 - 0.14% Coverage

The condition of using a Chinese contractor to implement an aid project has created   
numerous problems and highlights challenges within the Chinese aid mechanisms in the Paciﬁc and elsewhere.

Reference 5 - 0.21% Coverage

Technically, this may be true, but those involved in negotiating the housing loan deal in Fiji, for example, stressed that one of the biggest challenges was ﬁnding a Chinese company that was approved by the Chinese Government; a process fraught with issues and complicated by language barriers.

Reference 6 - 0.30% Coverage

A related issue throughout the region, which is especially explosive in PNG, is the   
inﬂux of Chinese migrants who are brought in to work on Chinese aid (and investment) project sites. Interviews revealed that in the eyes of local communities there is no distinction between Chinese migrants who come “independently” and are involved in small-scale investments and those workers speciﬁcally brought in for Chinese projects.

Reference 7 - 0.14% Coverage

Whilst the issue is complex and problems are widespread there is a question increasingly being asked as to why the PNG Government, for example, “is bending the [immigration] rules for the Chinese” (

Reference 8 - 0.12% Coverage

PNG has quite strong legal requirements regarding language skills and work permits, which are often being disregarded on both sides in order to facilitate Chinese funding

Reference 9 - 0.11% Coverage

As one PNG Government representative commented: “China’s ‘business approach’ is appealing to governments – they know that China is also beneﬁting.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 China’s agricultural and rural development engagement in Africa - § 3 references coded [ 1.28% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.26% Coverage

As for the issue of governance, China considers such forms of intervention to be an infringement of the sovereignty of partner countries (Schiere, 2011), however, China has begun to pursue a corporate social responsibility agenda as a means of meeting social needs previously unaddressed by its engagement (Brautigam, 2011).

Reference 2 - 0.50% Coverage

Also, despite the clear opportunity for agricultural development afforded by Africa’s abundant land, water, and other natural resources, Africa should increasingly emulate China’s emphasis on land productivity improvement (see “Agritech obstacles and opportunities in China-Africa agricultural development cooperation”), over Africa’s current paradigm of cultivated land expansion (Li et al., 2012), as the primary strategy for increasing its agricultural production (Xu and Li, 2012). In general, total investments in agriculture should at least meet the Maputo target of 10 percent of national public budgets.

Reference 3 - 0.51% Coverage

As discussed above, Chinese aid has prioritized the creation of agricultural technology   
demonstration centers since 2006. Unfortunately, as many African countries do not possess the ﬁnancial and administrative capacity necessary to fully leverage such aid efforts, the likelihood that China’s foreign experts anddemonstration centerswill be able to solve Africa’s deep-rooted agricultural development problems is dubious. It is imperative that aid-recipient African countries integrate the realization of the long-termbeneﬁts from the demonstration centers into their agricultural, technological and ﬁscal policies.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Marian Urbina Social policy in the context of new global actors- How far is China’s developmental model in Africa impacting traditional donors~ - § 7 references coded [ 1.46% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage

the social dimensions of China–African development cooperation move beyond the pro-poor redistributive paradigm currently advocated by Western donors

Reference 2 - 0.28% Coverage

China’s reluctance to embrace a common framework has raised concerns among aid campaigners who believe this situation could undermine current aid commitments to transparency, a rights based approach and democratic ownership and further weakens the legitimacy of the Paris consensus, adopted before the role of new donors like China was evident.

References 3-4 - 0.45% Coverage

Many forecast that the impact of the post-2008 global economic crisis will further exacerbate pressures on cash-strapped Western institutions, now facing in creased scrutiny to justify expenditure decisions from domestic electorates, and in this context the crisis paradoxically will open new opportunities for China. Interviewees observed that because many Western donors were reducing their contributions to development aid assistance, China’s increasing aid, trade and investment with African nations has both substantive and symbolic significance:

Reference 5 - 0.23% Coverage

Overall, most were positively persuaded by the Chinese experience in Africa. Somewhat surprisingly, given current social protection strategies, several Western organizations emphasized their support for China’s prioritization of economic growth rather than social expenditure

Reference 6 - 0.20% Coverage

This research suggest that China’s approach in the African continent is distinctly beginning to have an impact on Western ideas and activities at a variety of levels and new discourses concerning social policy aid to Africa are emerging as a result.

Reference 7 - 0.19% Coverage

Rather, simply by providing an alternative approach to aid recipients, China was introducing ‘competitive pressures’ into the system of international aid and forcing traditional donors to either justify their approach or revise it

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 The exceptional state in Africa Image management in Sino-African Relations - § 4 references coded [ 0.80% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.35% Coverage

In addition, these Chinese immigrants had exceptional qualities: according to Yuan, ‘[c]ompared to other ethnic groups…the Chinese were hard-working, and could take tough work; they seized every opportunity for business, going to places no European merchants were willing to go’. It is no wonder, then, that these Chinese immigrants are seen to have ‘played a role in furthering the economic development and social life of Africa

Reference 2 - 0.07% Coverage

first, it is possible that China may harbour a desire to be a moral actor as a good in itself.

Reference 3 - 0.10% Coverage

that Beijing makes claims of being an exceptionally moral actor in order to allay fears that its rise to power is a threat.

Reference 4 - 0.29% Coverage

It is reported that Chinese firms reportedly ask their workers whether or not they can ‘take hardships’ (neng chi ku 能吃苦) when interviewing them for taking up a position   
South African Journal of International Affairs 107   
in Africa, and this is perhaps additional testament to this enduring image of the African continent as a chaotic and underdeveloped hinterland.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2013 Warmerdam Having, Giving, Taking Lessons on Ownership in Ch - § 19 references coded [ 3.70% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.57% Coverage

One of the most important lessons from China for Africa is that countries should be responsible for their own development, and not rely on foreign donors. However, recipients are often restricted in their development strategies by donor requirements. The article will then analyse how China’s engagement with Africa contributes to increasing the negotiating capital of countries in Africa helping them to take ownership of their own development processes. It will conclude that China’s foreign aid programme is not geared speciﬁcally towards increasing recipient ownership, although there are a number of direct and indirect contributions. In addition, its international relations principles prevent more direct involvement in improving recipient ownership. For China to make a greater contribution to recipient ownership, a number of principles need to be revised.

Reference 2 - 0.19% Coverage

The OECD also highlights the important role ofthe Chinese government in guiding   
its socio-economic development (OECD, 2012, p. xii). It emphasizes the utility of policy experimentation, and the function of the Five-Year Plans to make weakness and challenges key focus points (OECD, 2012, p. xii).

Reference 3 - 0.18% Coverage

The OECD report echoes He Wenping’s ﬁndings that China acquired aid and investment not primarily for its ﬁnances rather in order to gain knowledge, skills, and technology and accelerate agricultural, industrial, and infrastructural modernization (OECD, 2012, p. xii)

Reference 4 - 0.11% Coverage

Finally, the OECD highlights the importance of the self-reliance approach through which ownership was exercised, and role of the development-oriented leadership.

Reference 5 - 0.15% Coverage

The Ofﬁce of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in China (OUNRCC, 2010) similarly underlines the importance of China’s strong national ownership and its clear development vision encapsulated in its Five-Year Plans.

Reference 6 - 0.09% Coverage

The World Bank states that learning rather than ﬁnance was the most important characteristic ofChina’s relationship with the Bank

Reference 7 - 0.08% Coverage

Ownership is deﬁned here as the ability of national governments to pursue their own development strategies on their own terms.

Reference 8 - 0.06% Coverage

These principles hold the potential to contribute to increasing recipient ownership.

Reference 9 - 0.10% Coverage

China’s potential contributions to recipient ownership as deﬁned above come   
through three channels: (1) aid, (2) FDI and trade, and (3) political.

Reference 10 - 0.25% Coverage

As most Chinese aid projects are infrastructure and construction projects, Chinese ﬁrms are used to construct these projects. This detracts from recipient ownership. While local workers are employed, and lower levels of the workforce are almost exclusively composed oflocal workers, there are far fewer workers in management positions (see for example Warmerdam and van Dijk , 2013).

Reference 11 - 0.13% Coverage

The Chinese government pays the Chinese implementing bodies directly from the funds dedicated for the projects. Therefore, there is little aid inﬂow, and little use of recipient structures and processes.

Reference 12 - 0.27% Coverage

The Chinese medical teams help to develop the technical and administrative capacities of wards in hospitals (e.g. the paediatric ward or surgery), as well as providing medicines and medical equipment. However, the effectiveness ofthese programmes can be questioned as they often stay in the recipient country for many years. In Uganda, the Chinese medical team has been present for approximately three decades.

Reference 13 - 0.12% Coverage

The capacity building and technical cooperation programmes, all target individual   
capacities, with the expectation that the overall institutional capacity is increased as a result.

Reference 14 - 0.29% Coverage

Nevertheless, it has been claimed that China’s engagement in Africa has often undermined hard-won governance standards (Moran et al., 2012). Chinese actions and policies have been said to undermine the human rights, good governance, transparency and accountability of African nations (Rotberg, 2008; Taylor, 2007; Tjønneland et al., 2006). Others state that China is undermining democracy in the developing world (Taylor, 2007; Zhu, 2010).

Reference 15 - 0.20% Coverage

In this sense, China is not contributing to improving the two components of political conditions of negotiating capital: political legitimacy and political effectiveness. However, the traditional donors’ efforts at improving political legitimacy and effectiveness have a similarly poor track record

Reference 16 - 0.41% Coverage

Analysis of China’s contributions to the ability of African countries to take ownership shows that the results are mixed and full potentialities have yet to be realized. China does provide many African governments with access to alternative sources of ﬁnance, other than traditional donor aid and economic relations, through its own aid programme, and economic engagement. In this sense, it increases the economic resources in the negotiating capital. There are no clear indicators of increasing the political resources, in the sense of the improving the political legitimacy or political effectiveness of recipients.

Reference 17 - 0.15% Coverage

However, China might be adding to recipient political negotiating capital at the international level. It does not contribute to the ideological resources, though these are inherently more domestically derived in nature anyway.

Reference 18 - 0.16% Coverage

While the Chinese government does provide a large numberofcapacity-building programmes ranging from medical and agricultural to technical and administrative, it does not utilize recipient structures and processes in its provision of project aid.

Reference 19 - 0.20% Coverage

Aid projects are initiated on the recipient side, suggesting a large degree of design ownership, which is then contrasted with the low level ofimplementation ownership as Chinese ﬁrms are contracted for project implementation, although local workers are employed and trained during project construction.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Foreign Aid and Development in Sino-African Relations - § 3 references coded [ 0.37% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.21% Coverage

However,   
it should be understood that, most of the aid that China gives is bilateral and tied to the use of Chinese firms and supplies. Suffice to argue here that, by tying aid to the use of Chinese firms and supplies, in itself is a form of condition for aid, even if it is not political conditions as is often imposed by the West

Reference 2 - 0.13% Coverage

the percentage of agreed aid that comes from China into Africa oftentimes comes in the form of materials as well as labor, but with elements of commitment on the part of Chinese to deliver without much ado.

Reference 3 - 0.02% Coverage

One sector in which trade between

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Kitano China’s Foreign Aid at a Transitional Stage - § 5 references coded [ 0.94% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

Rapidly increasing FDI on the part of Chinese enterprises has caused various socioeconomic and environmental issues, for which measures are being demanded.

Reference 2 - 0.31% Coverage

For example, in 2011, the President ofMyanmar announced the suspension of the Miytsone Dam project, ﬁnanced and constructed by a state-owned Chinese enterprise, because the Myanmar government was responsible for solving the social and environmental problems at the project site that were worrying the public.

Reference 3 - 0.13% Coverage

Even after the publication of the white paper, one of China’s issues with regard to foreign aid is further disclosure of information.

Reference 4 - 0.13% Coverage

It should be noted that, in 2013, the Ministry of Commerce made improvements in the disclosure of information, albeit in Chinese.

Reference 5 - 0.22% Coverage

The UK Department of International Development utilized the budget from the new Global Development Partnership Programme to launch a multinational cooperation with China by signing a memorandum of understanding in 2012.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2014 Towards a critical geopolitics of China’s engagement with African development - § 1 reference coded [ 0.18% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.18% Coverage

Ultimately, it is up to African leaders to manage their relations with China for the benefit of their own economies and citizens. It is not China’s responsibility to ‘look out’ for African self-interest. China’s abandonment of ideology in favour of a focus on economic growth arguably affords Africa a greater degree of space in its connection with China but only if this manoeuvrability is used wisely by Africa’s elites

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2015 Axel Dreher Rogue aid An empirical analysis of China’s aid allocation - § 11 references coded [ 1.50% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.18% Coverage

While political considerations shape China’s allocation of aid, China does not pay substantially more attention to politics compared to Western donors. What is more, China’s aid allocation seems to be widely independent of recipients’ endowment with natural resources and institutional characteristics. Overall, denoting Chinese aid as “rogue aid” seems unjustiﬁed.

Reference 2 - 0.23% Coverage

Na´ım (2007) characterizes its development aid as “rogue aid,” claiming it is unrelated to need in developing countries, but rather determinedby China’s national interests alone. The objectives ofChinese development assistance are, according to Na´ım, to gain greater access to resources and boost international alliances. Moreover, “rogue donors” are said to undermine the development efforts ofWestern donors to promote good governance in the developing world.

Reference 3 - 0.13% Coverage

In contrast to widespread perceptions, we ﬁnd no evidence that China’s aid is distorted towards countries with large natural resource endowments. Neither democracy nor governance play an important role. Overall, labelling aid from China as “rogue aid” seems unjustiﬁed.

Reference 4 - 0.10% Coverage

We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive impact of a recipient country’s exports to China in only two of the ﬁve phases. However, these are the two periods in which we expected commercial interests to be predominant.

Reference 5 - 0.10% Coverage

In quantitative terms, an increase in exports by 10% increases a country’s share in China’s aid projects by 0.013 percentage points in phase 3 (0.134Åln(1.1)) and 0.016 percentage points in phase 5.3

Reference 6 - 0.16% Coverage

While some of the more extreme concerns regarding China’s aid allocation seem to be exaggerated (rogue aid), to some extent, China’s critics might be right. To the extent that other donors reward democratic countries with more aid, the availability of aid from China could undermine the effectiveness of other countries’ aid

Reference 7 - 0.07% Coverage

While both China and DAC donors use aid for strategic reasons, China communicates more openly that its aid is supposed to be mutually beneﬁcial.

Reference 8 - 0.06% Coverage

. In particular, we did not ﬁnd that China’s aid is biased towards autocratic or corrupt regimes, as claimed by some critics.

Reference 9 - 0.14% Coverage

Based on how China’s aid allocation compares to aid ﬂows from other donors, it seems the fears that Chinese aid would undermine the efforts of other donors to promote democracy and good governance are exaggerated. Overall, the verdict that China’s foreign aid is rogue aid seems wide of the mark.

Reference 10 - 0.21% Coverage

China is still a recipient ofsubstantial development aid and has a lot in common with many recipients of its own aid. Therefore, Chinese aid might be   
44 While a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, the interested reader will ﬁnd detailed results in online appendices K, L and M.   
1020 A. Dreher and A. Fuchs   
more effective than that of the DAC donors, and developing countries might be more willing to listen to its advice (Davies 2007).

Reference 11 - 0.13% Coverage

That being said, the effectiveness of aid also depends on factors other than the motives for its allocation. Different modes of delivery, as well as project design and supervision, might make Chinese aid more, or perhaps less, effective compared to aid from other donors.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Dennis D. Institutional Mismatch and Chinese in the Philippines Challenges and Opportunities - § 18 references coded [ 2.91% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.13% Coverage

Not all recipients, however, find Chinese aid attractive. In the   
Philippines a public perception prevailed in the 2000s that Chinese financing was illegal and prone to corruption.

Reference 2 - 0.07% Coverage

that differences in aid regimes can lead to legal   
and political controversies in recipient countries

Reference 3 - 0.08% Coverage

When such controversies are embroiled in domestic politics, the aid becomes less appealing to the public.

Reference 4 - 0.19% Coverage

As I will show, Chinese aid in the Philippines was inevitably entangled in 2010 electoral politics because of legal and political controversies from two Chinese-funded projects, Northrail (Northern Luzon Railway Project) and National Broadband Network (NBN).

Reference 5 - 0.13% Coverage

These controversies were exploited   
Dennis D. Trinidad 303   
by political opposition groups, which succeeded in associating them with the unpopular incumbent administration.

Reference 6 - 0.09% Coverage

China took over the Northrail project when the Philippine government tried unsuccessfully to secure a loan package from JBIC.

Reference 7 - 0.08% Coverage

In spite of these generous Chinese aid pledges, the Philippine government’s utilization of Chinese aid was low.

Reference 8 - 0.21% Coverage

In particular, Chinese aid was enmeshed in political bickering between former president Arroyo and her successor, Benigno Aquino. Since nearly all of China-assisted loans were signed during Arroyo’s   
term, some of these projects have been associated with Arroyo’s “corrupt” administration.

Reference 9 - 0.21% Coverage

The plan was prepared under the Arroyo government with North Luzon Railways Corporation (NLRC) as the lead implementing agency to oversee the project. It was endorsed to JBIC, but because there were settlement issues15 that had to be resolved prior to construction, funding was not secured.16

Reference 10 - 0.08% Coverage

Unlike their Japanese counterparts, Chinese officials were   
unconcerned about the relocation issue.

Reference 11 - 0.20% Coverage

In February 2006, a group headed by attorney Harry Roque filed a lawsuit against the project, questioning the supply deal between CNMEG and Northrail on the basis that it violated the Philippine law on government procurement (R.A. 9184) and calling for the contract to be annulled

Reference 12 - 0.24% Coverage

On top of the legal impediment, the project also suffered from delays, communication problems between Northrail and CNMEG engineers, and allegations of kickbacks and corruption (Landingin 2010). The government’s poor handling of relocation issues of affected families along the tracks also created bad public relations.

Reference 13 - 0.24% Coverage

Because of the alleged involvement of several prominent political figures in the project, a Philippine Senate blue-ribbon committee called for an investigation that eventually led to the project’s cancellation and the resignation of Benjamin Abalos of the Philippines’ Commission on Elections, who allegedly brokered the deal.

Reference 14 - 0.24% Coverage

During implementation, supplies for the project are typically procured from Chinese companies while con-   
320 Institutional Mismatch and Chinese Aid in the Philippines   
tracts are awarded to Chinese SOEs. Although the procurement system of the Philippines is in principle open and competitive, tied aid may still be honored

Reference 15 - 0.20% Coverage

For new project proposals that are initiated by Chinese or other foreign businesses, implementing agencies must “own” these proposals and   
Dennis D. Trinidad 321   
justify that they are aligned with national development priorities at the expense of other important projects.

Reference 16 - 0.13% Coverage

China is also notoriously known for tying its aid to procurement from SOEs. As the case of the Philippines illustrates, Chinese SOEs initiate the first move in project identification.

Reference 17 - 0.19% Coverage

As my study emphasizes, underutilization is attributable to the fact that Chinese and Filipinos have aid institutions that are often inconsistent with each other, leading to legal and political controversies in two high-profile Chinese-assisted projects

Reference 18 - 0.18% Coverage

, the controversies that arose from Chinese-assisted projects and their subsequent entanglement in domestic politics, particularly during the 2010 elections, tarnished the image of China as a provider of financial assistance to the Philippines.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 Marica Don China’s Coherence in International Eonomic Governance - § 8 references coded [ 0.86% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.07% Coverage

Regarding development financing, however, China seems to be challenging the status quo, and is positioned to continue to do so.

Reference 2 - 0.13% Coverage

Compared to the international trade and investment regimes, it is in the international development aid regime that the Chinese challenge to today’s global norms is most noticeable, and where it can be argued that China is already having an important impact

Reference 3 - 0.11% Coverage

China’s continued promotion of tied aid, requiring the recipient to use   
some percentage of the funds to buy from Chinese companies, constitutes a challenge to a norm that traditional donors are trying to change.

Reference 4 - 0.14% Coverage

Eximbank is tied at 50 %. While tied aid is a common practice among many countries, including traditional donor countries, the practice is thought to lead to the purchase of overpriced goods and services, and, in 2001, DAC recommended untying aid to least developed countries

Reference 5 - 0.12% Coverage

oreover, Chin attributes entrenchment ofthe concept of ‘appropriate levels ofconcessionality’, that is, varying interest rates often at better than market terms, or offering grace periods, to China’sinfluence [16]

Reference 6 - 0.08% Coverage

Chin also points to a third effect: by supporting regional development banks, China   
is helping provide an alternative to the traditional donor

Reference 7 - 0.15% Coverage

What is under debate, is whether the AIIB will operate according to Western standards of good governance, transparency, environmental policies, etc., and as a result, Chinese officials are working hard to assure other governments that China is committed to Bfollow the international practice

Reference 8 - 0.05% Coverage

China’s development aid philosophy and policies are coming into direct conflict with Western norms.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2016 The Linkage between China’s Foreign Direct Investment and Ghana’s Building and Construction Sector Performance - § 4 references coded [ 1.45% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.28% Coverage

By using a robust regression model, the results show that China’s FDI in Ghana’s building and construction sector has significant positive effect on the economic growth of Ghana due to strong increase in investors’ confidence in the Ghanaian economy.

Reference 2 - 0.24% Coverage

Chinese FDI has a negative effective on growth through increase in employment whilst its improvement in infrastructure and access to financial packages has a positive and high significant effect on economic growth.

Reference 3 - 0.78% Coverage

he understanding is that, FDI contributes to economic growth when there is an improvement of the infrastructure and operational skills of the local building and construction companies. This will lead to the increase in revenue for citizens who are employed in this sector and thus leading to the overall economic development of the country. The study further showed that, Chinese foreign direct investment flows in Ghana’s building and construction sector through indirect effects have a much lower relationship with economic growth. However, Chinese FDI contribution to the local capacity building which is an indirect factor provides more room for efficiency and less room for poorly done works.

Reference 4 - 0.14% Coverage

he effects of Chinese FDI and Ghana’s building and construction sector performance had a relationship with government policies

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Dreher et al. Aid, China, and Growth Evidence from a New Global - § 3 references coded [ 0.38% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.18% Coverage

. Our results indicate that Chinese, U.S., and OECD-DACODA have positive effects on economic growth, but we find no robust evidence that World Bank aid promotes growth. We also find that, irrespective of the funding source, less concessional andmorecommercially-oriented types of official finance do not boost economic growth. Finally, we test the popular claim that significant financial support from China impairs the effectiveness of grants and loans fromWestern donors and lenders. Our results do not support this claim

Reference 2 - 0.11% Coverage

Our results suggest that Chinese ODA yields near-term economic growth impacts, as evidenced by the significant coefficients in the first three years. By contrast, the economic growth impacts of DAC and U.S. ODA appear to accrue over longer periods of time: the growth effects of DAC and U.S. ODA are still visible after six years.

Reference 3 - 0.10% Coverage

On the whole, we consider this body of evidence to be encouraging and think it should allay some of the longstanding fears that policymakers and policy analysts have expressed about China acting as “rogue donor” that undermines the effectiveness of Western assistance (e.g., Naím 2007).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Furuoka Determinants of China’s and Japan’s Foreign Aid Al - § 1 reference coded [ 0.56% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.56% Coverage

country’s self-interest. For example, Na~ım (2007) argued that China’s foreign aid represented a threat to international development cooperation. Moreover, foreign aid provided by some new aid donors, including China, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, has been described as a ‘rogue aid’ which is typically provided by a non-democratic country, which is not implemented in a transparent manner and which is not beneﬁcial to economic development of the aid recipients (Na~ım, 2007; Chahoud, 2007). Although the ‘rogue aid’ argument

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Kishi Chinese Official Finance and State Repression in A - § 13 references coded [ 1.93% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.09% Coverage

We find that Chinese official finance does increase the likelihood of African state repression upon its citizens. This is not the intent of China or Chinese assistance.

Reference 2 - 0.13% Coverage

The findings are that states in receipt of higher rates of unconditional, Chinese official finance actively engage in more violence against their citizens relative to states with more conditional, ‘traditional’ official finance profiles.

Reference 3 - 0.19% Coverage

While traditional official finance, such as that from Western states, may also result in violence, the findings in this paper specifically highlight the differences in the conflict patterns and dynamics that are seen as a result of the differing accountability and fungibility mechanisms associated with the various official finance types.

Reference 4 - 0.12% Coverage

Chinese official finance has brought significant and needed improvements including relatively high economic growth in Africa, debt cancellation, and needed infrastructure (e.g. roads, bridges, dams).

Reference 5 - 0.08% Coverage

Additionally, Chinese environmental and social standards have been cited as potentially problematic for Africa (Moss and Rose, 2006).

Reference 6 - 0.10% Coverage

Chinese official finance policies are accused of indirectly propping up dictatorships and tyranny, citing Sudan, Chad, and Zimbabwe as examples (Askouri, 2007; Samy, 2010).

Reference 7 - 0.15% Coverage

It is true that much of Chinese official finance is linked to Chinese goods and services, as opposed to fungible financial streams (for example, see: Lakatos, Maliszewska, Osorio-Rodarte, and Go, 2016; Zhang, 2016), which could be directly used to ‘pay for’ repression.

Reference 8 - 0.10% Coverage

This implies that Chinese support is not a resource disproportionately sustaining African states that may have no other access to outside resources as a result of violent histories

Reference 9 - 0.09% Coverage

There is again no difference between Chinese official finance versus official finance from traditional donors in regard to levels of state violence at large

Reference 10 - 0.30% Coverage

Compared to traditional official finance, Chinese official finance is more closely associated with increased state violence against civilians. But these observed effects of political violence should hold for any unconditional and unaccountable official finance, regardless of the donor. This deviates from other debates, which contend that official finance impacts violence through its effect on insurgence against the state through rent capture, rather than violence by the state (Grossman, 1992; Arcand and Chauvet, 2001).

Reference 11 - 0.14% Coverage

Crucially, Chinese official finance should not and does not support violence generally: there is no statistically significant support for Chinese official finance going specifically to countries having experienced recent violence or repression.

Reference 12 - 0.16% Coverage

China supports many forms of African regimes, and their direct and indirect effects on political violence vary depending on country specific circumstances. Only rarely do we observe an increase in more organized forms of conflict – such as rebel events – in line with Chinese support

Reference 13 - 0.29% Coverage

This agenda is much more amenable to African leaders who seek to remain in power, especially through repressing opposition. The increased appeal of China over ‘traditional’ donors by African leaders is symbolic of this growing trend and influence of China in the region. Though China is not specifically seeking to support already repressive, autocratic, and/or corrupt states, its unconditional aid structure is providing resources to those state leaders who are not afraid to use repression as a means to quell competition.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Palina Prysmakova Chinese Intergovernmental Relations and World Development - § 17 references coded [ 3.15% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage

Meanwhile, the borrowers have to deal with extra costs, for instance, high expenses to maintain final facilities or the cost of Chinese labor adaptation.

Reference 2 - 0.11% Coverage

In Belarus, the situation is exacerbated by the language barrier and a general anxiety of the local population derived from the lack of experience with foreigner

Reference 3 - 0.14% Coverage

Not being a part of the OECD arrangements, China is free to establish any proportions ensuring that it supports the exports of its local companies and assists the development of the third countries.

Reference 4 - 0.13% Coverage

the contrary, the current Chinese government sought to put no conditions on administrative regimes of the recipient countries since the very beginning of its foreign assistance history (e

Reference 5 - 0.43% Coverage

irst, the revenues go up by increasing profits of the local government’s own enterprises. Second, getting involved in the project, the private companies registered in the locality produce more and thus pay more money in taxes. Third, foreign projects generate at least temporary employment for both low- and highqualified workers. Fourth, growth of revenues is welcomed, because increased GDP gives local officials chances of promotion. In addition, any type of investment that brings promotion prospects within the government and party hierarchy increases the opportunities of personal gain through corruption

Reference 6 - 0.22% Coverage

Belarusian central government sees Chinese investment as a political advantage. Belarus has been long struggling to attract loans for infrastructure development from other countries, because their support comes with requirements for democratic reforms that go against the agenda of the Belarusian governmen

Reference 7 - 0.14% Coverage

because Chinese export credits usually come in   
package with their own workforce (Pál, 2013), Chinese projects do not open new jobs for Belarusians, which is a standard Chinese investment scenario.

Reference 8 - 0.15% Coverage

Chinese are tied to their employees by contracts (Ferreira, 2008; Haglund, 2009; Vines, Weimer, & Wong, 2009), or the Chinese labor is the only option, where “local skilled and literate workers are scarce and expensive”

Reference 9 - 0.06% Coverage

Chinese, nevertheless, avoid employing hundreds of Belarusian engineers available.

Reference 10 - 0.16% Coverage

The second drawback is that maintenance costs ofthe   
final infrastructure are to be financed by Belarus. The Chinese local governments enjoy building, because the expenses related to the maintenance is the burden of the borrower

Reference 11 - 0.16% Coverage

An even larger issue associated with export credits   
pertains to the misuse of public resources for personal gains. According to Transparency International (2005), construction projects are considered special engines for corruption.

Reference 12 - 0.24% Coverage

Chinese export credits also cause negative effects on   
the Belarusian balance of payments. Belarus has been constantly suffering from import payments exceeding its export revenues. Over the past decade, Belarusians have had to deal with a dramatic increase in bilateral trade with China, which led to a negative trade balance with this country

Reference 13 - 0.12% Coverage

Finally, while the Belarusian government accepts   
Chinese assistance, it lacks policies for the settlement and assimilation of temporary foreign workers and new immigrants.

Reference 14 - 0.31% Coverage

Chinese among 9.5 million of Belarusians is highly visible and raises anxiety among the local population due to the lack of experience with foreigners in general, and with non-whites in particular.Since China has become the first international donor in the region populated by exclusively white peoples, perceptions of racial identity, indeed, influence social and political relations, which is also very noticeable for the case of Belarus.

Reference 15 - 0.30% Coverage

The central and local governments in China see   
export credits as a solution, which allows local businesses operating without causing troubles for local governments. The associated burdens are transferred to recipient countries. Moreover, in some cases, if the operation was not transferred overseas, the local businesses would be closed due to the changes of the central government’s policies, for example, environmental.

Reference 16 - 0.16% Coverage

the Belarusian government has to deal   
with the abrupt changes of cost estimates and with the consequences, if purchased equipment becomes idle. Moreover, Chinese assistance might have negative ecological and economic consequences

Reference 17 - 0.22% Coverage

the Chinese export credits provide a new source of capital for developing countries, especially, for muchneeded infrastructure. Thus, Chinese assistance became a competitive alternative to the European–American approach to the modernization of the third world, which has “guided” development for over five centuries

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2017 Tracking Under-Reported Financial Flows China’s development finance and the aid-conflict nexus revisited - § 7 references coded [ 0.70% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage

Our results show that sudden withdrawals of “traditional” aid are only more likely to induce conflict in the absence of sufficient alternative funding from China.

Reference 2 - 0.11% Coverage

“new” suppliers of development finance have chosen not to participate in existing reporting systems, such as the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) or the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)

Reference 3 - 0.07% Coverage

As a result of this lack of transparency, China’s aid to Africa is the subject of much speculation, confusion, and misinformation.

Reference 4 - 0.08% Coverage

Scholars, policy analysts, and journalists routinely use inflated estimates to demonstrate the threat that China poses to Western donors on the continent.

Reference 5 - 0.08% Coverage

. We find that aid shocks significantly increase the probability of armed conflict onset if no sufficient alternative funding from China is available.

Reference 6 - 0.16% Coverage

Our results suggest that Chinese development finance may have a stabilizing effect in weak governments. More broadly, the findings highlight the importance of gathering better data on the development activities of China and other non-traditional donors to better understand the link between foreign aid and conflict.

Reference 7 - 0.12% Coverage

Extending the work of Nielsen et al. (2011), the empirical application of our dataset has shown that aid shocks from “traditional” sources are more likely to induce conflict onset only if insufficient alternative funding is available from China.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Bluhm et al. Connective Financing Chinese Infrastructure Proje - § 3 references coded [ 0.13% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.05% Coverage

Chinese development projects in general, and Chinese transportation projects in particular, reduce economic inequality within and between regions

Reference 2 - 0.05% Coverage

Chinese investments in “connective infrastructure” produce positive economic spillovers that flatten the spatial distribution of economic activity.

Reference 3 - 0.04% Coverage

Therefore, Chinese connective financing may help narrow spatial inequalities, but its overall impact is a more complex question.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Euri Lee The Belt and Road Initative Impact on Trade Patterns between China and Central Asia - § 5 references coded [ 1.86% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.29% Coverage

China is financing a host of developing countries through BRI in the form of non‑concessional loans. This raises a serious concern for debt sustainability in developing world. Central Asian region is no exception to this issue.

Reference 2 - 0.52% Coverage

In particular, 1% increase of Chinese bilateral ODF will increase 0.238% of bilateral trade volume with developing countries. Moreover, sharing a common border and being in RTA would increase 1.088% and 0.113% of bilateral trade volume, respectively. However, the feature of being landlocked would decrease bilateral trade volume by 1.211% and 1.469% (donor and recipient countries being landlocked).

Reference 3 - 0.17% Coverage

The impact of average OECD and Chinese ODF was significantly less than the impact of Chinese ODF specific to Central Asian Countries.

Reference 4 - 0.56% Coverage

growing debt risk in developing countries, which are especially vulnerable due to weak financial structure, questions debt sustainability and over   
196 East Asian Community Review (2018) 1:185–198   
dependence on Chinese government. This issue is significant in Central Asia in terms of both its domestic growth sustainability as well as the regional aspect due to high degree of interconnectedness within Central Asian countries.

Reference 5 - 0.32% Coverage

Particularly, there are two countries that alarm the risk of debt crisis in Central Asia—Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic—due to rapid increase in their debt to GDP ratio over recent years reaching almost 80% and 65%, respectively (Hurley et al. 2018).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Kassaye Deyassa Does China’s Aid in Africa Affect Traditional Donors - § 6 references coded [ 1.14% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.12% Coverage

China has made much stronger and more explicit links between development aid and economic activity than most Western donors.

Reference 2 - 0.21% Coverage

Respondents noted that China’s growing aid, trade and investment are of significant and symbolic importance to African countries, as many Western donors reduced their contributions to development assistance.

Reference 3 - 0.16% Coverage

Respondents also commented that the economic downturn had deprived the MDG framework as inadequate of meeting the challenges of the new international environment.

Reference 4 - 0.19% Coverage

In addition, interviewees reflected on the fact that the economic downturn had exposed the MDG framework as being inadequate to address the challenges of the new international environment

Reference 5 - 0.14% Coverage

several voices in the West call for increased participation by China   
(and the emerging powers more generally) in multilateral development fora.

Reference 6 - 0.31% Coverage

Our research shows that the responses were not homogenous and that the implications between the OECD-DAC members that form a continuum are not consistent. However, it is possible to identify some clusters of countries by their openness to SinoAfrican engagement and their mode of political participation.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Pippa Morgan Ideology and Relationality Chinese Aid in Africa - § 1 reference coded [ 0.38% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.38% Coverage

The rogue aid thesis is highly influential within media narratives. However, it has largely been refuted by existing quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence that shows (despite some high profile resources-for-assistance deals) at the aggregate level that Chinese aid to Africa is not disproportionately focused on resources, land-grabbing, or authoritarian regimes (e.g., Bräutigam 2015; Dreher and Fuchs 2015) and that Chinese engagement is generally viewed positively by Africans (e.g., Han and Huang 2016; Sautman and Yan 2009).

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2018 Xun and Shuai The International Political Significance of Chines - § 3 references coded [ 0.43% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.19% Coverage

The results of the analysis show, first, that Chinese foreign aid has changed recipient countries’ foreign policy positions, leading them to adopt policy preferences in international affairs that are further from those of the US. This has made it more difficult and less efficient for the US to buy votes through foreign aid.

Reference 2 - 0.16% Coverage

Second, as an important substitute for US aid, Chinese foreign aid may weaken recipient countries’ dependence on US aid, reducing their sensitivity to the rewards and punishments of the US foreign aid mechanism and eroding the “vote-buying” effect of US foreign aid.

Reference 3 - 0.09% Coverage

Third, because of the greater uncertainty attached to this means of vote-buying, the credibility of US foreign aid as a policy tool will be reduced.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Kinyondo Is China Recolonizing Africa Some Views from Tanz - § 3 references coded [ 0.38% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage

Many African countries see FOCAC as a positive arrangement to usher the continent out of a shameful cycle of dependency (Arrighi 2002; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). This is because it is assumed to be based on five critical values that are seemingly never practiced by traditional DPs in Africa.

Reference 2 - 0.14% Coverage

In such cases, when the signatory country happens to violate these instruments, it gets punished through travel bans, military invasion, and economic embargoes. In the end, the efficacy of mechanisms used by China depends on negotiation capabilities

Reference 3 - 0.07% Coverage

Finally, unlike traditional DPs, China seems to be comfortable investing in highly politically risky areas like Sudan

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Pippa Morgan Can China’s Economic Statecraft Win Soft Power in Africa - § 3 references coded [ 0.54% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.17% Coverage

Without knowing which private Chinese investors are actually operating in their   
jurisdictions, it is very difficult for Chinese officials to hold them accountable. Moreover, poor communications with the private sector also leads to lower policy awareness.

Reference 2 - 0.16% Coverage

In interviews with 58 personnel ofChinese companies inAfrica, Buckley andWeng ([9], 17) found that over halfofSOE interviewees had some level ofawareness ofChinese policies and guidelines, compared to only one-third of private sector respondents

Reference 3 - 0.21% Coverage

Small private Chinese firms have also been found to lag behind SOEs in environ-   
mental and social responsibility, as Chinese central authorities’ increasingly progressive attitude towards environmental responsibilities of Chinese firms operating abroad struggles to filter through to small private enterprises

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Pippa Morgan Old bottle new wine The evolution of China’s aid in Africa from 1965-2014 - § 1 reference coded [ 0.21% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.21% Coverage

Nonetheless, the sustainability of debt remains a major concern: Ethiopia’s economy needs to grow sufficiently quickly to raise the tax and export revenue needed to service its debts to Chinese institutions, otherwise the country may face serious financial trouble in future.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Sears What Counts as Foreign Aid Dilemmas and Ways Forw - § 8 references coded [ 2.92% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.20% Coverage

Chinese foreign aid and investment might well represent an early sign of such a breach and thus understanding these outward flows could offer a privileged window onto a shifting geopolitical terrain.

References 2-4 - 1.59% Coverage

aid disbursements to the African continent have received substantial attention in geography and beyond (Carmody and Taylor 2010; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power 2010; Carmody 2011; Williamson 2012), as well as in media and policy circles (Gill and Reilly 2007). The debate in the United States centers around China’s willingness to give development aid to other nations while still struggling with poverty and inequality itself (Glosny 2006). In addition, critics charge China with upholding corrupt governments through aid disbursement and thus negatively affecting the plight of human rights (Council on Foreign Relations 2005; Wells 2011; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2016). Isaksson and Kotsadam (2016) pointed to more widespread corruption around active project sites funded by the Chinese government. This debate is not unique to China, however. Numerous scholars and policy analysts note the intractable nature of this problem among Western donors as well, whose aid funds have been linked to corrupt regimes in countries such as Uzbekistan, Haiti, and Kenya (Transparency International 2015; Bovard 2016). One major limitation to an empirically driven intervention into this debate is China’s lack of transparency and data reporting on foreign aid disbursements. Several scholars (Br€autigam 2009, 2011, 2012; Carmody 2011; Tan-Mullins, Mohan and Power 2010; Dreher et al. 2018) have noted that China’s unwillingness to publish development assistance data beyond aggregate figures for select years contributes to a perception of secrecy and

Reference 5 - 0.18% Coverage

China’s refusal to publish annual bilateral aid figures makes it difficult for researchers to gather the correct data on the country’s bilateral development assistance.

Reference 6 - 0.60% Coverage

At a high-level OECD meeting in Paris in 2014, the DAC decided to introduce a grant equivalent system to give more weight to concessional loans and give a higher credit amount to grants over loans (OECD 2014). This change can be viewed as an attempt by Western donors to expand aid definitions to meet multilateral objectives set in the MDGs and SDGs. The expansion can also be seen as a geopolitical strategy in which member countries aim to maintain dominance in the global foreign aid system in the face of new actors, like China, expanding their donor role and operating under different standards.

Reference 7 - 0.22% Coverage

China is perhaps hesitant to join the DAC due to such stringent and restrictive definitions and, importantly, the lack of recognition for nonmonetary aid and, aid-in-kind, which the country disburses on a large scale.

Reference 8 - 0.11% Coverage

We cannot assume, however, that Chinese development will constitute a clear alternative to Western practice.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2019 Seven decades of Chinese state financingin Africa - § 16 references coded [ 3.52% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 1.45% Coverage

of the evolution of Chinese   
state ﬁnancing in Africa. On the one hand, they illustrate important continuities. First, China’s government has consistently been willing to ﬁnance major transportation, power generation, and other infrastructure projects that serve as ‘building blocks’ of development, often in precarious political and geographic environments. China is relatively unique in this regard, given other bilateral and multilateral donors’ growing reluctance to ﬁnance these projects (Dollar 2008). Second, Chinese ‘aid’ and other forms of state ﬁnancing have attracted feverish levels of international scrutiny, but this attention is not new (Large 2008). Just as Chinese-ﬁnanced projects are deeply controversial today – in particular following the launch of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – Chinese development projects in earlier eras were also met with considerable scepticism, including its largest historical aid project, the TAZARA railway in Tanzania and Zambia. Indeed, claims that China and other non-Western ﬁnanciers are ‘rogue donors’ that threaten the incumbent development regime were preceded by serious concerns about the political motives and economic viability of Cold War-era Chinese projects in Africa (Naím 2007). Third, as with other donors, China remains a highly pragmatic development partner. China’s leaders have consistently viewed aid as an important geopolitical tool in Africa that yields a range of economic, political and security beneﬁts. Indeed, when engineers from the Yellow River Sanmenxia Engineering Division (黄河三门峡工程局)1 were deployed to Guinea for work on the Kinkon Falls project, Chinese government oﬃcials reportedly informed them that ‘this is an economic job, and is also a political responsibility’ designed to contribute to China’s positive international image (Liu 2011). In short, a complex spectrum of strategic interests have informed Chinese state ﬁnancing since its inception. On the other hand, the two hydroelectric projects in Guinea also reveal important shifts   
in China’s identity as a

Reference 2 - 0.15% Coverage

The details of Chinese-ﬁnanced development projects in Africa have long been shrouded in secrecy, in part because China’s government has never published detailed or comprehensive records of these activities.

Reference 3 - 0.12% Coverage

Comparatively, twenty-ﬁrst-century Chinese development ﬁnance does not appear ‘rogue’ in rhetoric or practice. A growing body of empirical evidence supports this   
claim.

Reference 4 - 0.11% Coverage

In short, historical and contemporary evidence demonstrate that Chinese aid to African   
countries is now far less ‘rogue’ or revisionist than commonly believed.

Reference 5 - 0.12% Coverage

Relative to World Bank projects, Chinese- ﬁnanced projects may increase local corruption and perceptions thereof (Brazys, Elkink and Kelly 2017; Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018).

Reference 6 - 0.30% Coverage

one study ﬁnds that China’s ‘aid on demand’ approach aﬀords African leaders greater control over sub-national aid allocation, resulting in a skewed spatial distribution of Chinese aid in favour of African leader home and ethnic regions (Dreher et al. 2019). On balance, historical and recent evidence suggests a complicated and uneven reality in terms of how contemporary Chinese state ﬁnancing aﬀects African economies and societies.

Reference 7 - 0.15% Coverage

China’s presence as an additional development partner might aﬀord African leaders greater agency and bargaining power when negotiating development ﬁnancing arrangements (Greenhill, Prizzon and Rogerson 2016).

Reference 8 - 0.09% Coverage

Similarly, empirical evidence on the contemporary debt implications of Chinese devel-   
opment ﬁnance remains relatively thin

Reference 9 - 0.10% Coverage

eality appears more nuanced than popular suggestions that developing countries invariably face threats of Chineseinduced debt ‘traps’.

Reference 10 - 0.09% Coverage

These ﬁndings build on arguments which suggest earlier concerns about non-Western development ﬁnance and debt were overstated

Reference 11 - 0.12% Coverage

Finally, as revealed by the datasets discussed above, debt relief and debt forgiveness have been important components of Chinese foreign assistance in the contemporary era.

Reference 12 - 0.07% Coverage

African governments’ capacities to acquire, analyze and publicize detailed loan information appear to

Reference 13 - 0.11% Coverage

be highly consequential factors for determining whether and to what extent project ﬁnancing from China (or other sources) will create debt sustainability problems.

Reference 14 - 0.26% Coverage

China’s government appears responsive to the potential debt implications   
of its ﬁnancing to African countries, as well as the international community’s perceptions thereof. Presumably, a wave of Chinese-induced debt crises across developing countries is not in China’s political interest, a reality that sceptics of China’s loan-based ﬁnance have often neglected.

Reference 15 - 0.18% Coverage

Though less eye-popping than assertions about subversive Chinese ‘rogue’ aid, this reality is one that leaders and publics in African countries increasingly need to grapple with as China becomes a more prominent bilateral and multilateral development partner.

Reference 16 - 0.10% Coverage

African economies and the decision makers that govern them appear to have   
growing levels of agency over the consequences of Chinese ﬁnancing.

Files\\Journal Articles in English\\2020 Dong and Chapman Foreign aid study Chinese schools and Chinese point - § 1 reference coded [ 0.16% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.16% Coverage

hen studying the role of China’s foreign aid, Chinese scholars often   
associate foreign aid with foreign trade and foreign investment. The results of empirical analysis show that China’s foreign aid has a significant role in promoting trade with and investment in recipient countries.